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REFLECTIONS ON THE GOLDEN SPIKE: A
LOOK AT THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
AND RAILROAD REORGANIZATION
ByDavid P. Graybeal*
The Northern and Southern Railway has been operating at a
lossfor a number ofyears. Forseeing the inevitability of default on
its next payroll, the companyfiles a petition in bankruptcy, seeking
court sponsored reorganization. After three orfour years of contin-
uous de§icit operation and physical plant deterioration,' the bank-
ruptcy courtfinally approves a reorganization plan: the claims of all
mortgage bondholders are honored by giving them ten cents to the
dollar in the form of common stock in the surviving corporation.
But the trains roll on and the company is able, though barely, to
operate without further default. "We object," the creditors cry,
"Our claims have been impaired and yet the railroad continues to
operate just as before." 'Hush," responds the court. "The public
interest, that creditorfirst in line and mostfavored by our Congress,
needs the rail service. "
This note directs attention to a "takings" problem: the constitu-
tional parameters within which the interests of the creditor in the bank-
rupt railroad's assets will be subordinated to the interests of the public
in continued rail service. In particular, this note compares the historic
plight of the railroad's creditor, as illustrated by the fictional scenario
involving the Northern and Southern Railway, with his expected fare
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1 In Section I, the "takings"
problem will be developed through a discussion of the prior bank-
ruptcy law and railroad reorganization cases arising thereunder. Sec-
tions II and III discuss the railroad's obligation to serve the public and
the public's interest in being served, respectively. The former section
reviews the conditions under which a common carrier railroad may ter-
minate train service or abandon trackage; the latter section comments
upon the federal experiments in nationalization-Amtrak and Coin-
rail-and reviews those cases striking the balance between creditor's
* B.A., 1974, Yale University; M.A., 1976, University of California, Berkeley; M.B.A.
Candidate University of California, Berkeley; member third year class.
1. Efg., New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
2. E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Reform Act]. In order to clarify citation, prior bankruptcy statutes will be cited to the
United States Code with a 1976 date and their amendment will be noted.
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rights and the obligation of the carrier to continue public service. Sec-
tion IV outlines the pertinent reorganization reform of the 1978 Re-
form Act and examines the competing House and Senate bills. This
note concludes that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 perpetuates by
statute past judicial assessment of the proper balance between public
and private interests in railroad reorganization while at the same time
providing relief to the insolvent carrier's creditors.
I. The Framework of the Bankruptcy Law
Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution explicitly
charges Congress with the responsibility for a uniform and rational
bankruptcy law.4 The Fifth Amendment also provides that there shall
be no taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion.5 Normally, there is no conflict between the operation of the bank-
ruptcy law upon the estate of an insolvent debtor and the Fifth
Amendment prohibition of uncompensated takings of private property
for public use; the debtor's property is simply distributed among his
creditors according to a scheme which gives some claims priority over
others and treats some debts as non-dischargeable.6
Under its authority over the law of bankruptcy, Congress has also
enacted legislation authorizing and guiding business reorganization.'
If a business is insolvent or unable to make timely creditor payments,
but nevertheless is a potentially profitable firm, the bankruptcy law
provides the business with an opportunity to restructure its operations
and debt, free from the burden of the creditors' claims.' But if the reor-
ganization does not meet with the approval of a majority of materially
affected creditors, then the firm faces normal bankruptcy proceedings.9
For a number of reasons, railroad reorganization has always been
treated separately under the bankruptcy acts.' ° Other business reorga-
nizations are the subject of a separate and distinct statutory scheme.
The principal rationale is that every railroad, whether intrastate or in-
terstate in scope, is engaged in interstate commerce, the protection and
regulation of which is a responsibility charged by Congress to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICQ under the authority granted by the
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.").
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 35, 93 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 507, 523.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-799 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 1101-74.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 714, 723 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 301,
362.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-62 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1129.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 1161-74.
Constitution's commerce clause." The public is included in the reor-
ganization process through its representative, the ICC.' 2 A second rea-
son that railroad reorganization is the subject of separate statutory
treatment is that railroads are already subject to extensive ICC regula-
tion,' 3 the purpose of which is to effect a rational interstate transporta-
tion system that is fair to both shipper and carrier, regardless of region.
By requiring the railroad in bankruptcy to continue to comply with
various ICC regulations and procedures, including continued public
service, the "rationality" of the national transportation system is pre-
served.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 the interests of the
public entered the reorganization process by two means. First, each
class of creditors of both railroads and other corporate business was
required to accept or reject the proposed reorganization plan.' 4 How-
ever, in the case of a railroad's reorganization, the bankruptcy court
could approve a plan despite its rejection by any class of creditors, pro-
vided that the court found that the plan "makes adequate provision for
fair and equitable treatment for the interests or claims of those rejecting
it [and] that such rejection is not reasonably justified in the light of the
respective rights and interests of those rejecting it. . . .'5 Prior bank-
ruptcy law also provided for the fair and equitable treatment of the
claims by those creditors rejecting the reorganization plan of non-rail-
road businesses, but it included language requiring the "adequate pro-
tection" of the creditors' interests withproperty.'
6 In the determination
of the "reasonableness" of the railroad creditor's rejection of a plan, the
bankruptcy court would consider the public interest in continued rail
service as well as any property satisfaction the creditor's claim.' 7
The second and more direct injection of the public interest was
through the integral role played by the ICC in the creation and ap-
proval of a reorganization plan. Within six months after the filing of
the petition in reorganization, or within the time limits established by
any number of six-month extensions, the bankrupt railroad was re-
quired to file a reorganization plan with both the bankruptcy court and
the ICC.18 Initially, the Commission would order hearings on the plan
11. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10501-05 (West 1979) (replacing 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (amended 1978); Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1164. The
proper role of the ICC was a subject of considerable dispute in the drafting of the Reform
Act. See section IV dnd particularly the text accompanying notes 169-82 infra.
13. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1-1332.3 (1979).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 575-576 (1976) (amended 1978).
15. Id. § 205(e) (amended 1978).
16. Id. § 616 (amended 1978).
17. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 535-36
(1946).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1976) (amended 1978).
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and was required to approve a plan which "in its opinion. . . will be
compatible with the public interest."' 9 Once certified by the ICC, the
bankruptcy court would hold hearings to determine the fairness of the
plan to the creditors.2' Failing approval by the court, the plan would
be sent back to the ICC, and the cycle begun again.21 Except with re-
spect to public utilities, nowhere in the law of corporate reorganization
did the public get so direct a voice in the restructuring of the business
firm.
2 2
The ICC's active representation of the public's interest in a situa-
tion where there is already insufficient money to satisfy the claims of
the railroad's creditors naturally raises the specter of an uncompen-
sated taking of the creditor's estate for the benefit of the public. 23 This
tension between creditors' rights and the public interest is well recog-
nized by the courts charged with the responsibility of overseeing the
reorganization process:
Underlying the provisions of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act is
the principle that, in order to vindicate the public interest in con-
tinued rail service, the normal rights of creditors and investors
may be held in suspension for a reasonable time in order to
achieve reorganization, and upon reorganization may be drasti-
cally altered if necessary. Nevertheless, there are limits beyond
which this public interest cannot be served without violating the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation.24
Prior to the Reform Act, there were two contexts in which a tak-
ings problem arose. The first is typified by the facts of the New Haven
Inclusion Cases." On July 7, 1961 the New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad filed a petition to enter bankruptcy reorganization.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 205(e) (1976) (amended 1978).
21. Id. One of the most frequent objections to this procedure is the excessive time de-
lay. All the while the bankrupt is in reorganization, the creditor is without remedy, save for
the sale of his claim at an extreme discount. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 577-578 (1976) (amended 1978).
23. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fir. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 535-36
(1946).
24. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1356, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970) and Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm'n,
251 U.S. 396 (1920)). The court continued: "These limitations are measured both in term of
the amount of erosion of the Debtor's estate which can be permitted to occur before impair-
ing liquidation value, and in term of the length of time that is reasonable for assessing the
ultimate prospects of achieving sufficient profitability to support a valid recapitalization of
the enterprise. If there is sound support for a conclusion of ultimate profitability, interim
erosion is less critical, except, of course, to the extent that it may require assurance of a
greater degree of ultimate profitability because of the increase of priority debt which must be
taken into account in the reorganization plan." 347 F. Supp. at 1366.
25. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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Two years later it became apparent that the railroad would probably
never become a profitable operation and the ICC attempted to force
the New Haven to merge with another railroad.26 The pending merger
of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads provided a con-
venient solution to the New Haven's problem. As a condition prece-
dent to ICC approval of the Penn Central merger, the successor
company was required to absorb the debt-ridden New Haven.
At issue in the New Haven Inclusion Cases was the price which the
Penn Central Transportation Company would pay for the deteriorating
assets of the New Haven railroad.28 The district court approved an
amount equal to the railroad's liquidation value as of December 31,
1966, almost five and a half years after the petition for reorganization
was filed.29 The mortgage bondholders, whose claims were already
subordinate to back taxes and post-bankruptcy trustee certificates (used
by the New Haven to finance operating losses), objected to a valuation
that was some $88 million less than the railroad's value when it entered
reorganization.3 ° Among other theories, the bondholders' suit alleged
that the failure to compensate for the deterioration of the New Haven's
assets in the 1961-1966 period was an uncompensated taking of their
estate for public use.31 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
public interest could not compel a railroad to operate at a loss indefi-
nitely,32but it nevertheless held that since no bondholders had re-
quested the liquidation of the New Haven prior to the 1966 valuation
date, there could be no complaint as to the price.33
The suggestion that the New Haven bondholders had no claim to a
pre-1966 valuation of the railroad's assets solely because there had
been no request for liquidation masks the Court's actual holding. This
underlying concern became apparent in In re Boston and Maine Corpo-
ration.34 In that case, the creditors did request the liquidation of the
26. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 800 (D. Conn. 1969). The
district court stated, "By late 1963 it was clear... that only two courses were open: . . . the
inclusion in a Penn Central merger or. . . liquidation. The former was obviously in the
public interest and the latter was not." Id.
27. Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475, 522-27 (1966).
For a general discussion of the problems created by the inclusion of the unprofitable New
Haven into an already financially weak Penn Central, see R. SOBEL THE FALLEN COLLOS-
sus, ch. XI (1977).
28. 399 U.S. at 399.
29. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn. 1968).
30. Id.
31. 399 U.S. at 489-95.
32. Id. at 491-92. See Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); Rail-
road Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79 (1924).
33. 399 U.S. at 493. For a highly critical analysis of this decision, see Note, Takings and
the Public Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1004 (1973).
34. 484 F.2d 369 (1973).
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railroad, but the appellate court refused to take issue with the district
court's approval of the bankruptcy trustee's authorization of capital ex-
penditures over the objections of the creditors. "It has long been estab-
lished," the appellate court stated, "that secured creditors may be
required to defer realizing on their security for a reasonable time to
permit the trustees to make efforts to reorganize the railroad."35 Thus,
while the court and the ICC search for a plan that accords with the
public interest, the cost of delay in the slow reorganization process is
constitutionally chargeable to the creditor's account.
The second occasion giving rise to the takings problem occurred
when a reorganization plan had been approved and its rejection by a
materially and adversely affected class of creditors was held unreasona-
ble. Such a situation arose in Reconstruction Finance Co. v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western R.R.,36 where nearly eighty percent of the general
mortgage bondholders rejected a reorganization plan under which they
would receive ten cents to the dollar in stock in the reorganized com-
pany as compensation for their claims 7.3  The Supreme Court, revers-
ing an appellate court finding that the rejection by the bondholders was
reasonable, stated:
These [creditors] cannot be called upon to sacrifice their property
so that a depression-proof railroad system might be created. But
they invested their capital in a public utility that does owe an
obligation to the public. . . .[B]y their entry into a railroad en-
terprise, [they] assumed the risk that in any depression or any
reorganization the interests of the public would be considered as
well as theirs.38
The Court did not indicate if, how, or to what extent, the rail investor is
to be -compensated for such assumed risk. Nor did it indicate what
effect this unique form of bankruptcy risk would have on the
creditworthiness and health of the railroad industry.
Whether it be the delay of the reorganization process or the treat-
ment under the reorganization plan that causes an impairment of the
creditor's estate, the argument justifying such impairment proceeds
from the dual premises that (1) the public has an interest in continued
rail service and (2) the carrier has an obligation to provide such service
to the conclusion that the railroad's creditors may be required to bear
the cost of this service. The next two sections will explore the railroad's
obligation to serve the public and the public's interest in being served.
35. Id. at 374.
36. 328 U.S. 495 (1948).
37. Id. at 502.
38. Id. at 535-36.
II. The Obligation to Serve the Public
The obligation placed upon the railroad to serve the public derives
from its historical role. The railroad industry, from the foundation of
the original Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 1826 to the semi-public
Consolidated Rail Corporation in 1975, has been both sponsored and
regulated by government.39 Many railroads, most notably the trans-
continentals, have received grants of land as incentive to expand their
lines.40 Most railroads have received only limited monopoly status and
authority to exercise eminent domain in order to create rights-of-way.4 1
In exchange for this sponsorship, the railroads were obligated to serve
the public along their lines. 42 Government regulation of this service
quickly followed the railroad's last spike, first through the establish-
ment of state commissions and then with the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887. The ICC brought uniformity to rail-
road regulation and curbed the discriminatory practices of the state
commissions. 43 That the railroads are a kind of public utility, state-
regulated monopolies, is the starting point of the inquiry into the na-
ture of their obligation to serve the public.
The railroad's obligation to serve the public can be measured by
its freedom to respond to market conditions in the conduct of its busi-
ness, to act as a profit-maximizing firm, and to withdraw from unprofit-
able ventures. In the context of railroad bankruptcy and
reorganization, the pertinent question is to what extent may a railroad
terminate service or abandon a line when the service or line has be-
come unprofitable?
39. For an interesting history of government sponsorship of the first American rail-
roads, see, R. SOBEL, supra note 27, at 1-47 (1977).
40. See, e.g., An Act to aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from
the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, and to secure to the Government the Use of the
same for Postal, Military, and Other Purposes, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
41. See generally C. CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF RAILROAD ABANDONMENTS
(1948); M. CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS (1964). See, e.g., Gates v.
The Boston & N.Y. Air Line R.R., 53 Conn. 333, 5 A. 695 (1885); Southern Ry. v. Franklin
& P.R.R., 96 Va. 693, 32 S.E. 485 (1899).
42. See, e.g., State ex rel Naylor v. Dodge City, M. & T.R.R., 53 Kan. 377, 36 P. 747
(1894); Hinckley v. Kettle River R.R., 70 Minn. 105, 72 N.W. 835 (1897).
43. "The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were to secure just and rea-
sonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust discriminations in the rendition of like
services under similar circumstances and conditions; to prevent undue or unreasonable pref-
erences to persons, corporations or localities; to inhibit greater compensation for a shorter
than for a longer distance over the same line; and to abolish combinations for the pooling of
freights." ICC v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 276 (1892). See generally G. KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 (1965); I. SCHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION (1931). The Interstate Commerce Act was recently revised, codified,
and enacted into title 49 of the United States Code. Revised Interstate Commerce Act, Pub.
L. 95-473, § 1, 82 Stat. 1337 (Oct. 17, 1978). The Act "may not be construed as making
substantive changes in the laws replaced." Id. at § 3.
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With respect to both service termination and line abandonment,
Congress has enacted specific statutes" that impose a balancing test
under which the public's need for convenient rail service is weighed
against the burden of such service on interstate commerce. Thus, in the
case of service terminations, the ICC may order the restoration of serv-
ice sought to be abandoned if the service is "required or permitted by
present or future public convenience and necessity and will not unrea-
sonably burden interstate or foreign commerce. .. .
There are few determinative rules in applying this test. Upon the
1958 enactment of the service termination statute as section 13a of the
Interstate Commerce Act, the Senate reported that its purpose was to
authorize the termination of rail services that "no longer pay their way
and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the
heavy financial losses entailed. ' 46 In Southern Railwar v. North Caro-
lina,47 a case involving a petition by the interstate carrier to terminate
two intrastate passenger trains, the Supreme Court reviewed the legis-
lative history of the statute and established two general rules for the
application of the balancing test. First, the profitability of the train
service, or lack thereof, may be considered as an element in the bal-
ance, but the fact that the train service is presently unprofitable does
not, by itself, authorize its termination.48 Consequently, a railroad may
be required to operate an unprofitable train. Secondly, the overall
profitability of the railroad may be considered as a factor in the deci-
sion to permit termination of service, but the fact that the railroad as a
whole is profitable does not require a decision to continue the service.49
The Court did not decide the converse of the issues presented by these
two rules: (1) whether abandonment is permissible when the service
itself is profitable; and (2) whether abandonment is impermissible even
when the railroad, as a system, is unprofitable. Presumably, no in-
stances of the former case will arise; and, in the latter case, unless the
railroad is suffering only temporary business decline, it will probably
seek the protection of bankruptcy reorganization. The unprofitability
of the service to be terminated and the overall profitability of the rail-
road are relevant factors only to the extent that they reveal the ability
44. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903 (West 1979) (abandonment of lines) (replacing 49 U.S.C. § la
(1976)); 49 U.S.C.A. § 10908 (West 1979) (discontinuance of service) (replacing 49 U.S.C.
§ 13a (1976)). A "service termination" involves the discontinuance of a particular kind of
service, e.g., passenger operation, along a particular line while retaining other service, eg.,
freight operation, along the same line. A "line abandonment" entails termination of all
service along a line and usually involves physical removal of the trackage.
45. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10908(c) (West 1979).
46. S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1958).
47. 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id. at 104-05.
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of the railroad to absorb the local loss without harm to its interstate
service.
By contrast, line abandonment operates under what might be
called the Certificate System. The Interstate Commerce Act was
amended in 1920 to prohibit a railroad from engaging in any new rail
construction or line extension without a certificate from the ICC stating
that "the present or future public convenience and necessity require or
will be enhanced by . . . such extended or additional line of rail-
road."5 Abandonment requires a similar certificate; "the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or permit the abandon-
ment or discontinuance.
51
This Certificate System is an outgrowth of the relationship which
the early railroads enjoyed with the state of their charter, the state
franchise or charter was construed as a contract between the carrier and
the public. 2 The Supreme Court, in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v.
Public Service Commission,53 stated:
One of the duties of a railroad company doing business as a
common carrier is that of providing reasonably adequate facili-
ties for serving the public. This duty arises out of the acceptance
and enjoyment of the powers and privileges granted by the State
and endures so long as they are retained. It represents a part of
what the company undertakes to do in return for them, and its
performance cannot be avoided merely because it will be at-
tended by some pecuniary loss.
5 4
In Fort Smith Light & Traction Company v. Bourland, the Court held
that a local loss did not warrant termination of the local line. Rather,
the Court required the traction company to choose between aban-
doning its entire operation and returning its franchise to the city or,
alternatively, operating the entire franchise at a loss, even though the
loss was attributable to the one local line.
The requirement that a railroad obtain an ICC certificate of "pub-
lic convenience and necessity" before engaging in any new construction
serves two functions. First, it is a means by which the ICC can prevent
over construction by financially week carriers and the inefficient dupli-
cation of routes. Rationalization of the nation's rail system is particu-
50. 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)(a) (1976) (originally enacted Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat.
477). The Revised Interstate Commerce Act requires that the ICC find that "public conven-
ience and necessity require or will be enhanced by the construction or acquisition (or both)
and operation of the railroad line." 49 U.S.C.A. § 10901(a) (West 1979).
51. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West 1979) (replacing 49 U.S.C. § la(l) (1976)). The cur-
rent version adds that "the Commission shall consider whether the abandonment or discon-
tinuance will have a serious, adverse impact on rural and community development." Id.
52. See generally C. CHERINGTON, supra note 41.
53. 242 U.S. 603 (1917).
54. Id. at 607.
55. 267 U.S. 330 (1925).
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larly important in light of the fact that total route miles of trackage has
been declining throughout this century as other forms of transportation
have developed. 6 Secondly, the Certificate System provides the legal
framework (the contract between the carrier and the public) under
which the carrier's freedom to abandon a line may be regulated. The
certificate of public convenience and necessity embodies the obligation
of the carrier to render continuous service to the public."
Early judicial interpretation of the "public convenience and neces-
sity" test indicated that the phrase itself involves a balancing of carrier
and shipper interests. In Colorado v. United States,5 8 the state of Colo-
rado sought to protect local industry by challenging the ICC's approval
of a carrier's request to abandon intrastate line. In upholding the ICC's
decision, Justice Brandeis held that the "public convenience and neces-
sity" standard requires consideration of the burden on interstate com-
merce imposed by the unprofitable line. 9 Thus, the determination of
public need for a particular line involves a balancing of the local de-
pendency upon continued rail service and the burden of the unprofita-
ble service upon the shipping public at large.
In actual practice, the ICC has eschewed consideration of carrier
prosperity and has balanced the losses suffered by the specific carrier
against the losses to be suffered by the local public in the event of aban-
donment.6 ° In this regard, the volume of local traffic and the depen-
dency of local industry on rail transportation are the most critical
factors. The difficult cases involve rail-dependent industries such as
coal mines or grain elevators. A study of such cases has observed that
"[t]he result always depends upon balancing the sum total of such indi-
vidual losses against the operating deficit being incurred by the appli-
56. In 1930, the nation had 230,602 miles of track in freight service. By 1960, there were
only 208,043 miles. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, STATISTICS OF RAILWAYS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1920-1953) (published yearly); INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1954-1978) (published yearly).
57. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926). "The charter of the Colorado
& Southern," declared Justice Brandeis, "is a contract with the State. By accepting the char-
ter, the Company assumed the obligation of providing intrastate service on every part of its
line within the State .. " Id. at 161-62.
58. 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
59. Id. at 169.
60. See generally C. CHERINGTON, supra note 41, at 125-36. This approach is not with-
out judicial approval. "In many cases, it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the
degree of dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means of
transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier may not justly be
required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by operation. In some
cases, although the volume of the whole traffic is small, the question is whether abandon-
ment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject the communities
directly affected to serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light
burden upon a prosperous carrier." Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1925).
cant."6' Since individual circumstances predominate in the ICC
decision, there are but a few general rules: the line must be unprofita-
ble before abandonment will be permitted; there must be rail-depen-
dent industries before abandonment will be prevented; and, overall
prosperity of the carrier is only tangentially relevant, if at all.
Notwithstanding the restrictions placed on line abandonment by
the Certificate System or by a carrier's charter, there is a point at which
continued operation by an unprofitable carrier cannot be compelled.
In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, the Supreme Court
held that where there is no reasonable hope of future profitable opera-
tion, the privately financed railroad cannot be compelled to continue its
service to the public.62 The case involved an unprofitable feeder line
abandoned by its profitable lumber-company owner. The Railroad
Commission for the state of Louisana issued an order to show cause as
to why service on the line should not be reinstated. Despite a showing
that the line was unprofitable, the Commission concluded that service
could be compelled provided the overall enterprise--carriage and
mill-was profitable.63 The Supreme Court reversed and, in an opin-
ion by Justice Holmes, held:
It is true that if a railroad continues to exercise the power con-
ferred upon it by a charter from a State, the State may require it
to fulfil an obligation imposed by the charter even though fulfil-
ment in that particular may cause a loss. . . .But that special
rule is far from throwing any doubt upon a general principle too
well established to need further argument here. . . .If the plain-
tiff be taken to have granted to the public an interest in the use of
the railroad it may withdraw its grant by discontinuing the use
when that use can be kept up only at a loss.'
This holding was quickly affirmed by two subsequent cases: Bullock v.
Florida ex rel Railroad Commission65and Railroad Commission v. East-
ern Texas Railroad.66 In each case the Supreme Court permitted the
railroad to replace service with salvage on the theory that compelled
operation at a loss would be an unconstitutional taking of property for
public use. In the latter case the Court stated: "The controlling princi-
ple is the same that is applied in the many cases in which the constitu-
tionality of a rate is held to depend upon whether it yields a fair
return.
67
In their subsequent application, however, these holdings have
61. C. CHERINGTON, supra note 41, at 133.
62. 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1926).
63. Id. at 398.
64. Id. at 399.
65. 254 U.S. 513 (1921).
66. 264 U.S. 79 (1924).
67. Id. at 85. See also 251 U.S. at 399.
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been limited. Brooks-Scanlon was decided almost one month before
the enactment of legislation giving the ICC jurisdiction over route ex-
tension and abandonment.68 Bullock, decided a year later, portended
the eventual application of the Certificate System. In that case, the
Court qualified the Brooks-Scanlon holding: "Without previous statute
or contract to compel the company to keep on at a loss would be an
unconstitutional taking of its property."6 9 Similarly, in Eastern Texas,
the Court distinguished between permissive and impermissive charters:
only the permissive charter creates no obligation to serve the public at a
loss.7 0 An ICC certificate that an abandonment is permitted without
harm to the public's convenience and necessity is a statutory condition
of abandonment; it is not a "permissive" charter. Thus in the context
of abandonment by carriers within ICC jurisdiction, the formality of
obtaining a certificate of abandonment becomes a condition precedent
to legal cessation of service. In Meyers v. Jay Street Connecting Rail-
road,71 the carrier petitioned the ICC for a certificate permitting aban-
donment of all service, but, prior to any regulatory approval,
announced cessation of operation. Despite the railroad's unprofitabil-
ity, an injunction forbidding termination of service was sustained pend-
ing issuance or denial of an abandonment certificate.72 If the Brooks-
Scanlon doctrine has any remaining life, it is applied only in instances
where the ICC lacks jurisdiction or as a parameter within which the
ICC must consider abandonment petitions.
73
Although railroads earn a notoriously low return on their invest-
ment,74 it is rare that a railroad, even in bankruptcy reorganization, has
68. Brooks-Scanlon was decided February 2, 1920; the Interstate Commerce Act was
amended February 28, 1920. See note 50 supra.
69. 254 U.S. at 521 (emphasis added).
70. 264 U.S. at 85. A charter is "permissive" if, under its terms, the grantee company is
authorized but not required to engage in rail operation. Such charters are more akin to
licenses such as those typically granted to taxi companies. Withdrawal from operation is
permitted by economic necessity. The impermissive charter binds the grantee company,
upon its acceptance, to perpetual service along the route of the charter.
71. 259 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1958).
72. Id. at 535.
73. To the extent that the ICC retains jurisdiction over line and service abandonments
during the reorganization process, the bankrupt railroad may not terminate service absent
the appropriate ICC certificate. Prior to the Reform Act, the ICC did have such jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (amended 1978); In re Central R.R. of N.J., 485 F.2d 208 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). Under the Reform Act, the ICC may express its
opinion regarding proposed abandonments, but the bankruptcy court is empowered to grant
abandonment over the objection of the Commission. Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1170.
74. See generally MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL (1978) [hereinafter cited as
MOODY'S]. In the 1966-78 period, the return on investment, after adjustment for deprecia-
tion, fell from a high 3.9% in 1966 to a low of 0.83% in 1978. Even more striking, net income
in constant 1966 dollars fell from $904 million to $27 million. As earnings sagged, improve-
ment outlays rose, RAILWAY AGE, Jan. 30, 1978, at 59; Record-high activity, but little profit,
REFLECTIONS ON GOLDEN SPIKE
no hope of regaining profitability. Hence, the first condition of the
Brooks-Scanlon doctrine-that there be no reasonable expectation of
future profits-is rarely met. The exceptional case was the bankruptcy
of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad in 1961. Without
hope of profitable operation, its liquidation was threatened by the dis-
trict court in 1968 under the Brooks-Scanlon holding.75 Only its forced
participation in the merger of the New York Central and Pennsylvania
Railroads avoided wholesale termination of service.7 6 Recent history
has not, however, afforded any other tests of the continued viability of
BrooksScanlon.
77
In summary, the rail carrier's obligation to serve the public is cre-
ated by the carrier's acceptance of its franchise and by the Certificate
System, under which new lines are constructed and old lines aban-
doned only if required or permitted by public convenience and neces-
sity. The obligation may be avoided only if the railroad is hopelessly
unprofitable and, even then, only if it is outside the jurisdiction of the
ICC or made subject to an order in excess of the ICC's authority.
The next section explores the public interest in continued rail serv-
ice, historically the fundamental concern of the ICC. The section first
examines the recent experiments in nationally funded rail service-
Amtrak and Conrail-and then discusses the impact of continued serv-
ice on the rights of creditors of insolvent carriers.
III. The Public Interest in Being Served
A. Government Funding of Rail Service
From almost the first iron spike, but certainly to Amtrak's latest
concrete tie,78 the federal government's interest in railroads has been
nothing short of intense. Railroads were the vehicle by which the na-
tion expanded; they were the catalyst necessary for economic develop-
ment. The transcontinentals received land grants as a means of
financing construction.79 The Interstate Commerce Commission was
RAILWAY AGE, Jan. 29, 1979, at 60. With that kind of performance, the railroads would do
better by liquidating their assets and purchasing government securities.
75. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 459 (D. Conn. 1968).
76. Some passenger service was abandoned with ICC permission under 49 U.S.C. § 13a
(1976) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10908 (West 1979)) as being an undue burden on
interstate commerce and permitted by public convenience and necessity. E.g., New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., Trustees, Discontinuance of Passenger Service between Boston and Need-
ham Heights, West Medway, Blackstone and Dedham, Mass., 327 I.C.C. 77 (1965).
77. See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 278-82 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1356, 1366 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
78. Why DOToptedfor concrete ties in the Northeast Corridor, RAILWAY AGE, Sept. 12,
1977, at 32-34.
79. See note 40 supra.
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created to nationalize rate regulation;8" its jurisdiction subsequently ex-
panded to include new construction, abandonment, consolidations and
mergers, as well as regulation of the trucking industry.8" Rail labor has
its very own act,82 as does retired rail labor.83 Safety,84 employer liabil-
ity,85 hours of employment,86 boiler inspection,8 7unemployment insur-
ance8 8 and ashpans89 have all been the subjects of separate and distinct
Congressional Acts. With all this government regulation of and inter-
est in the nation's railroads, and their characteristic low return on in-
vestment and many bankruptcies, why is it that the industry has not
been nationalized? One answer is that the obligation of the common
carrier to serve the public, described in the previous section as uncondi-
tional save in the rare instance of hopeless insolvency, precludes any
need for public funding of deficit operations except when the private
sector cannot be compelled to provide further capital. In this writer's
view of history, the exhaustion of private capital is precisely what
forced Congress to enact the Amtrak and Conrail" legislation. Each
80. See note 43 supra.
81. "It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to
provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provi-
sions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of
each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic
conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment
and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discrimi-
nations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to
cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof, and to encourage
fair wages and equitable working conditions;--all to the end of developing, coordinating,
and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other
means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense." Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, § 1, 54 Stat. 899. See 49
U.S.C. § 1(18) (1976) (added by Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 477) (current
version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10901 (West 1979)) (new construction); 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1976)
(added by Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 480) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11342-47 (West 1979)) (mergers and consolidations); 49 U.S.C. § la (1976) (first enacted
as 49.U.S.C. § 1(19)-(20) by Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 478) (amended and
renumbered Act of Feb. 5, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 802, 90 Stat. 127) (current version at
49 U.S.C.A. § 10903 (West 1979)) (abandonments).
82. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 1, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (amended seven times).
83. Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307 (amended 42 times); Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305-1361 (amended 3 times). See also
Railroad Retirement Tax Act, ch. 709, 60 Stat. 722 (1946) (amended eleven times).
84. Act of Oct. 16, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971.
85. Employer's Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (first of four such acts).
86. Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (1907) (first of four such acts).
87. Boiler Inspection Act, ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913 (1911) (first of seven such acts).
88. Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, ch. 680, 52 Stat. 1094 (1938) (amended 23
times).
89. Ash Pan Act, ch. 225, 35 Stat. 476 (1908) (never amended).
90. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (codified in 45
U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976)).
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is an instance in which continued rail service in the public interest
could only be preserved by public financing.
Amtrak is the result of system-wide unprofitability and deteriora-
tion of the nation's passenger trains in the 1950-1970 era. During this
period, otherwise profitable railroads were burdened by unprofitable
service. Rather than force railroad freight operations to forever subsi-
dize passenger service, Congress created a semi-public corporation-
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation-to assume the respon-
sibility of providing passenger rail service.92 In exchange for cash
and/or passenger equipment, according to a formula based on a per-
centage of the carrier's passenger deficits, the railroads received com-
mon stock in the corporation and each was relieved of "its
responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers by rail in intercity
rail passenger service. . . ."I' The corporation commonly known as
Amtrak, assumed this responsibility and was entitled to contract with
the participating railroads for the use of their tracks and facilities.94
But the creation of a national passenger railroad has not closed the gap
between operating costs and fare revenues. Since 1970, Congress has
appropriated more than three billion dollars for the corporation's net
operating expenses. 95 Additionally, loan guarantees of $900 million
and direct grants of $463 million have been extended for capital
projects.
96
Unlike the problem that led to the creation of Amtrak, which in-
volved essentially profitable railroads burdened with an unprofitable
service, the crisis that preceded the creation of the Consolidated Rail
Corporation involved the financial collapse of all major carriers in the
northeast.97 The first to enter bankruptcy was the Central Railroad of
New Jersey in 1967.98 Three years later, the largest carrier, the Penn
Central Transportation Company, filed its petition.99 The four remain-
ing railways quickly followed.1o Almost three years after the filing of
91. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (codi-
fied in 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976)).
92. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1976). Of the seventeen directors of the National Railroad Passen-
ger Corporation, one is the Secretary of Transportation, another is the President of the cor-
poration, eight are appointed with Senate approval by the President of the United States;
three are elected by common stockholders and four are elected by preferred stockholders.
Id. § 543.
93. 45 U.S.C. § 561 (1976).
94. Id.
95. MOODY'S, supra note 74, at 708.
96. Id.
97. See generally R. SOBEL, supra note 27.
98. MOODY'S, supra note 74, at 416.
99. Id. at 332. The filing date was June 21, 1970.
100. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company filed on July 24, 1970. Id. The Philadelphia
& Reading Railroad Company filed on November 23, 1971. Id. at 407. They were followed
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Penn Central's petition in bankruptcy, the district court expressed seri-
ous doubt that the railroad could be reorganized without government
assistance.' 0' The court threatened to order cessation of all operations
as of October 1, 1973, with liquidation to follow as soon as practical,
unless a definitive reorganization plan was presented to the court by
July 2, 1973.102 Congress responded quickly with the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973,103 creating two entities: the United States
Railway Association (USRA),' 4 a non-profit association whose duties
include the desigh of a final system plan for the Northeast,'0 5 and the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail),0 6 whose principal function
is the operation of the rationalized system.'" Conrail's Series B pre-
ferred and common stock were exchanged for the rail properties of the
six bankrupt railroads, and Series A preferred stock and debentures
were issued to the USRA.' °0 USRA functions as a conduit for govern-
ment aid, which as of the first quarter of 1979 totaled $2.154 billion
dollars.'0 9 Despite the words of the enabling act that "[t]he final system
plan shall be formulated in such a way as to effectuate. . . the crea-
tion, through a process of reorganization, of a financially self-sus-
taining rail and express service system,"" a viable railroad is yet to be
created. " I
Why did the unprofitability of the American passenger train and
the collapse of the major northeast railroads deserve government
bailouts, when ordinary and singular bankruptcy reorganizations did
not? It was not a more intense public interest in continued rail service
by the Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company on June 26, 1972, Id. at 320, and the Lehigh
and Hudson Rivers Railway Company.
101. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
102. Id. at 1346. A plan was filed by July 2, 1978, and the court ordered immediate filing
with the ICC and requested certification by the latter by October 31, 1978. In re Penn
Central Transp. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
103. Supra note 91.
104. 45 U.S.C. § 711 (1976).
105. Id. § 712(a)(1).
106. Id. § 741(a).
107. Id. § 742.
108. Id. § 741(e).
109. RAILWAY AGE, Jan. 29, 1979, at 4.
110. 45 U.S.C. § 716(a)(1) (1976).
111. On December 1, 1978, Conrail Chairman Edward J. Jordan stated: "At this time,
Conrail is losing 10 cents for every dollar of freight revenue it receives. Obviously, Conrail
has too much unprofitable traffic on too much plant. But plant reduction decisions made on
the present rate-making and abandonment process do not address the root causes of non-
compensatory traffic." ConrailDefers Line Abandonmdnts, RAILWAY AGE, Dec. 25, 1978, at
12. But see RAILWAY AGE, July 30, 1979, at 14, which reports that Conrail enjoyed a second
quarter, 1979, profit of $29.4 million. Conrail Chairman Jordan is reported as saying: "The
Northeast section of the nation now has a reliable freight transportation system in Conrail.
Conrail is ready to serve its customers to a better degree than ever in its brief history and in
the recent history of its predecessors."
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that warranted national aid to the bankrupt Penn Central 1 2 but not to
a predecessor bankrupt, the New Haven. 1 3 Rather, the semi-public
Amtrak and Conrail were born of necessity, with no private source of
capital available and no other means to prevent termination of service.
Unprofitable rail passenger service by the private carriers could not be
compelled indefinitely under the termination of service statute.' 14 At
some point the burden on the carriers' ability to provide efficient inter-
state freight service would outweigh any further need for passenger
trains. Some kind of nationalization was the only means of preserving
a national rail passenger system. Similarly, the Conrail legislation was
compelled by the threat of liquidation of the Penn Central.' ' Private
capital was no longer available to fund a continued deficit operation.
However, a different situation prevailed when the New Haven col-
lapsed. In that instance, quite conveniently, the Pennsylvania and New
York Central Railroads were discussing merger and could be, and
were, compelled to include the New Haven, operate trains and absorb
its losses.
116
The Amtrak and Conrail experiments in nationalization illustrate
the extreme to which a creditor may be required to dedicate his security
interest to public service. After the New Haven Inclusion Cases, there
appears to be no ascertainable outer limit at which public funds are
required, constitutionally, to pick up the tab for continued rail opera-
tion. 117 Pragmatic necessity, not some rule of law, opens the federal
pocketbook in the aid of dying carriers.
B. The Public Interest and Creditor Rights
What justifies continued deficit operation of a railroad during re-
organization and subsequent approval of a reorganization plan which
adversely and materially affects the value of the creditors' claims? It is
frequently asserted that during reorganization, the normal rights of the
creditor may be suspended for a reasonable period. This assertion,
however, does not explain why impairment of a creditor's estate during
such a period is not a taking of private property for public use."' The
Fifth Amendment prohibition of uncompensated public takings func-
tions as a constitutional parameter to any act of the federal govern-
112. See notes 97-110 supra.
113. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
114. 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C.A. § 10903 (West 1979)). See
text and notes in Section II supra.
115. See notes 101-02 supra.
116. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970). See 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1976) (cur-
rent version at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 11343-11347 (West 1979)).
117. See text accompanying notes 25-36 supra.
118. See note 24 supra.
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ment, including the operation of the bankruptcy laws." 9 Hence, any
suspension of the rights of the creditor during the reorganization proc-
ess cannot permanently enjoin the right to compensation when the
creditor's property is taken for a public purpose. Therefore, simply
stating, as two courts have done, 20 that during reorganization the cred-
itor's rights may be suspended for a reasonable period of time does not
rebut the creditor's Fifth Amendment argument; some further assertion
is required. Two such arguments have been advanced: first, that there
is indeed a taking of the creditor's property, but that he has, in some
manner, waived his right to Fifth Amendment protection; and second,
that there is no taking of property at all.
Support for the view that the creditor has waived his Fifth Amend-
ment right to compensation for any public taking of his property can be
found in Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In some addendum re-
marks, the Court asserted that the investor in a railroad "assumes the
risk" that his property will be dedicated to public service. 121 The idea
is that even though the bankruptcy and reorganization of a railroad
may necessitate some deterioration or impairment of the creditor's se-
curity in order to prevent any termination of publicly needed service,
no creditor is ever compelled by the government to place his funds at
such risk. Given voluntary investment and foreknowledge of the bank-
ruptcy laws, the investor can hardly complain when a foreseen but low
probability down-side risk is realized. The public's interest in contin-
ued rail service does not itself justify suspension of the creditor's rights
and the deterioration of his estate, but satisfaction of the public's desire
for continued rail service at the expense of the creditor is permissible
where in accord with the government's past practice, and the creditor's
notice and acceptance of the risk.
Provided there is some past practice that one wishes to perpetuate,
the argument provides a justifying rationale. It does not, however, jus-
tify the past practice itself. Yet, uncompensated takings of private
property for public use are constitutionally prohibited. 12 2 But if illegal,
how can the operation of the bankruptcy laws, themselves subject to
the Fifth Amendment, give rise to a past practice of uncompensated
takings-the risk which the creditor ostensibly assumes. The waiver
theory is an incomplete, if not unsatisfactory, justification for court or-
dered rail service at private expense.
The alternative argument is that there is no public taking of the
creditor's security interest even though the assets of the railroad are
eroding during the reorganization. This proposition would be most
119. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935).
120. See note 24 supra.
121. 328 U.S. at 535-36.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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plausible if, upon approval or a reorganization plan, the creditors re-
ceived property equal to the liquidation value of their claims as of the
date of the initial bankruptcy. Forced operation of the railroad during
the reorganization, in lieu of liquidation, would not cause the creditor
to be in any worse position than if liquidation had occurred immedi-
ately.
Some commentators 23 have asserted that this argument represents
the essential teaching of Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust
Company v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac4Yc Railway.'24 In that case,
the bankruptcy court enjoined the secured creditors from forcing a
foreclosure sale of the carrier's pledged property, whose value far ex-
ceeded the carrier's obligations. The Supreme Court upheld the in-
junction on the ground that legislation drawn under the constitutional
authority of Congress to enact uniform bankruptcy laws may inciden-
tally impair private contract.125 In Continental Illinois, the injunction
went "no further than to delay the enforcement" of debenture agree-
ments."2 Referring to the possible decline in value of the pledged se-
curity during the duration of the injunction, the Court stated that "[a]
claim that injurious consequences will result to the pledgee. . . may
not, of course, be disregarded. ... 17 Since in this case the value of
the pledged security far exceeded the value of creditor's claims, 28 the
mere delay in satisfaction caused no irremediable harm.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in the New Haven Inclusion Cases
cited Continental Illinois in support of its holding that creditor rights
are not absolute. 29 In the Inclusion Cases, the Court held that a mort-
gage bond holder may be delayed in attempts to reach the security even
if the delay causes irremediable loss. Whether a suspension of reme-
dial rights is injurious to the creditor "'presents a question addressed
not to the power of the court but to its discretion-a matter not subject
to the interference of an appellate court unless such discretion be im-
providently exercised." "3 0 The Court certainly did not understand
Continental Illinois to prohibit the suspension of creditor rights when
there is great likelihood of harm.
The Court's substantive holding-that there was no uncompen-
123. See Note, Assuring Adequate Rail Service: The Conflict Between Private Rights and
Public Needs, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1429, 1434-35 (1977); Note, Takings and the Public
Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1004, 1011-14 (1973).
124. 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
125. Id. at 680.
126. Id. at 681.
127. Id. at 677.
128. See id. at 658-59.
129. 399 U.S. at 420.
130. Id. at 490-91 (quoting Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 677 (1934)).
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sated taking of the property of the New Haven creditors-rests upon
Justice Reed's opinion in Reconstruction Finance Corporation that the
creditor invests funds in a public utility with an obligation to serve the
public, and therefore in reorganization the interests of both creditor
and public are considered. 3 ' Justice Brandeis has described the car-
rier's obligation as a "contract with the State."' 32 The essence of his
argument is that the creditor, by investing in a railroad, subordinates
his rights to the obligation of the carrier to serve the public and may
not reclaim his funds in a manner that would jeopardize the carrier's
ability to satisfy its obligation. The creditor has not waived his Fifth
Amendment right to compensation for any public taking of his estate.
Rather, he has so aligned himself with the carrier that during bank-
ruptcy reorganization, when the railroad's continued ability to serve the
public is most in doubt, there is no taking of the creditor's estate absent
the unlawful demand that the railroad itself continue operation. The
creditor's loss is instead characterized as the realization of a foreseeable
risk. As noted in Section I, the carrier's obligation to serve the public
admits of few exceptions, and it is not surprising that the railroad's
creditor, having assumed the obligation of the carrier with his invest-
ment, may not freely withdraw his funds when the carrier enters bank-
ruptcy reorganization.
The next section reviews the provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 as they pertain to railroad reorganization and the taking
problem developed in this note. Various versions of the bill will be
discussed.
IV. Reorganization Reform
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,133 a plan of reorgani-
zation was required to be drafted and submitted by the debtor-railroad
to both the bankruptcy court and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.' 34 Such a plan would "include provisions modifying or altering
the rights of creditors . . . through the issuance of new securi-
ties. . . ."I" After public hearings, the Commission would certify a
plan, though not necessarily the one submitted, which "in its opinion
...will be compatible with the public interest .. .. ,136 Once a plan
had been certified by the Commission, the court would request that all
affected parties state their objections to the plan as well as any claims
131. 328 U.S. at 535-36.
132. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1926).
133. See note 3 supra.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1976) (amended 1978).
135. Id. § 205(b).
136. Id. § 205(d).
for equitable treatment. 37 Thereafter, the court either would approve
the plan if, inter alia, it was fair and equitable, 38 or would disapprove
the plan and either dismiss the proceedings or refer the plan back to the
Commission. 3 9 Once the interchange between the court and the ICC
had resulted in an approved plan, each class of creditors would be re-
quested to express either its acceptance or rejection.' 40 If two-thirds of
the actual vote of each class (as measured by the dollar volume of its
claims) approved the plan, then it would be confirmed by the court. 141
Should any class of creditors or stockholders reject the plan, the court
could nevertheless confirm the plan upon a finding that such rejection
was not "reasonably justified in the light of . . . all the relevant
facts."
142
The central feature of this process of certification, approbation and
confirmation is the joint jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and the bankruptcy court. The Commission functions as the
voice of the public and the advocate of the public's interest, while the
bankruptcy court functions as an adjudicatory body, balancing the in-
terests of the creditors once the Commission certifies that the plan con-
forms to the public interest.
The natural consequence of this joint responsibility is the consid-
erable and exascerbating delay between the filing of the initial petition
in bankruptcy and the final confirmation of a reorganization plan. The
lapse of time is often considerable, the longest being twenty-three years
for the final reorganization of the Missouri Pacific Railway. 43 During
this period, the creditor's right to his security is suspended. No interest
need be paid on any debt, and often the value of the railroad's assets
deterioriates. It is not uncommon for the asset value of the reorganized
railroad to be less than the liquidation value of the railroad upon initial
bankruptcy.'" Nor is it surprising that the railroad's creditors have
objected loudly to such a tedious reorganization process, a process that
often leaves them with less satisfaction of their claims than if the rail-






143. The Missouri Pacific Railroad was in reorganization from 1933 to 1956. MOODY'S,
supra note 74, at 248. Long reorganizations do not always result in a financially sound
company. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, which entered bankruptcy reor-
ganization on March 17, 1975, had previously been reorganized during the fourteen-year
period between 1933 and 1947. Id. at 133.
144. This was precisely the plight of the creditors of the New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad and the source of complaint in the New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S.
392 (1970).
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road had been sold for scrap.
145
Reform of the bankruptcy law has proceeded concurrently in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was created by Congress in 1970
to review and recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Act.' 46 In 1973,
the Commission reported its findings and proposed a draft bill, which
was submitted to the 93rd Congress as H.R. 1079214 and S. 4026.148
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges submitted an alterna-
tive draft of a bill to the House as H.R. 16643.149 No action was taken
on either bill in the 93rd Congress, and both drafts were resubmitted in
the 94th Congress as H.R. 31150 and S. 2351 (the Commission's bill),
and H.R. 32152 and S. 236113 (the Judges' bill).'5 4 Extensive hearings
were held by the respective House and Senate Judiciary Committees.'55
With respect to railroad bankruptcy reorganization, the recom-
mendations of both the Bankruptcy Commission and the Judges Con-
ference were essentially the same. Reorganization plans need not be
submitted to the ICC for certification, but such plans as the court "finds
worthy of consideration" would be submitted to the Commission for
"examination and advisory report."' 5 6 Any line abandonment, how-
ever, would require approval by the ICC. Approval could be granted
expressly or by reason of ICC inaction.'57 After the ICC had transmit-
ted its advice to the court, or had expressed its intent to remain silent,
145. Id.
146. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The creation of the Commis-
sion was preceded by Senate investigation of the bankruptcy laws. Hearings on S.J Res. 100
Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968).
147. H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
148. S. 4026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
149. H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
150. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also Hearings on HR.1 31 and HR. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., appendix (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Hear-
ings].
151. S. 235, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1974).
152. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). See also 1975-1976 Hearings, supra note 151.
153. S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
154. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978), reprinted in [1978, No.
lIl] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 179-81; S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1978), reprinted in [1978, No. IlcI U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3-4.
155. 1975-1976 Hearings, supra note 150; Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Be/ore the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comn on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
156. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 9-503(a) (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 31]; H.R.
32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10-503(a) (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 32]; 1975-1976Hear-
ings, supra note 150, at 318-19.
157. H.R. 31, supra note 156, § 9-403(a); H.R. 32, supra note 156, § 10-403(a); 1975-1976
Hearings, supra note 150, at 316-17.
the court would notice a hearing of all creditor and stockholder objec-
tions to the reorganization plan,'58 following which the court would
submit the plan for creditor approval.'59 If a simple majority (mea-
sured by dollar volume of claims actually voting) of each class of credi-
tors approved the plan, 160 then the court would confirm the plan
provided, inter alia, that it was "compatible with the public interest."'
6'
If a class of creditors or equity security holders rejected the plan, then
the plan itself would have to provide for payment of the value of the
claims. '
62
This procedure differed from the existing law in several respects:
(1) it eliminated the need for court "approval" of the plan prior to con-
firmation, 163 (2) it required creditor acceptance by simple rather than
two-thirds majority,"6 (3) it provided for cash payment of the value of
claims of creditors who had rejected the plan rather than testing credi-
tor rejection against some standard of reasonableness,' 65 and (4) it
vested in the court, rather than the ICC, the decision as to whether the
plan was or was not compatible with the public interest.
166
With respect to the takings problem developed in this note, these
changes are fundamental. First, since joint approval of a plan was not
necessary, the time-c6nsuming process of review and resubmission by
both the ICC and the bankruptcy court would be eliminated. This
might have provided for a speedier reorganization of the bankrupt rail-
road and fairer treatment of its creditors. Explicit time requirements
for reorganization, however, were not included in either bill. Secondly,
allowing the court to determine the compatibility of the plan and the
public interest would have fundamentally altered the nature of court's
confirmation decision. Rather than balancing the rights and interests
of the various creditors and equity security holders after certification by
the ICC, the court would be able to directly balance the rights and
interests of the creditors as a group with the interest of the public in
continued service. Thirdly, a reorganization plan could not have been
imposed upon a class of creditors that had rejected the plan absent sat-
158. H.R. 31, supra note 156, § 9-503(b)-(c); H.R. 32, supra note 156, §§ 10-503(b)-(c);
1975-1976 Hearings, supra note 150, at 255.
159. H.R. 31, supra note 156, § 7-306(d); H.R. 32, supra note 156, § 7-305(d); 1975-1976
Hearings, supra note 150, at 255.
160. H.R. 31, supra note 156, at § 7-310(d); H.R. 32, supra note 156, § 7-308(d); 1975-
1976 Hearings, supra note 150, at 260-61.
161. H.R. 31, supra note 156, § 9-503(d)(2); H.R. 32, supra note 156, § 10-503(d)(2); 1975-
1976 Hearings, supra note 150, at 320.
162. H.R. 31, supra note 156, §§ 7-303(7)-(8); H.R. 32, supra note 156, §§ 7-301(7)-(8);
1975-1976 Hearings, supra note 150, at 249.
163. See I I U.S.C. § 205(e) (1976) (amended 1978).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. § 205(d).
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isfaction of their claims. This was a substitute for the existing scheme
under which the plan could be imposed upon any rejecting class of
creditors provided that such rejection was found to be unreasonable
under all the circumstances. 167 Rather than balancing the interests of
the rejecting creditors against those of the public, as in Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, the court would have been required to find ex-
plicitly that the reorganization plan was compatible with the public in-
terest and satisfied the claims of rejecting classes of creditors.
68
The role of the ICC, time requirements for confirmation of a plan,
and treatment of rejecting classes of creditors were all subjects of revi-
sion in subsequent versions of the bankruptcy bills. The hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights re-
sulted in the introduction of H.R. 6 in the 95th Congress, 69 and its
mark-up, amendment and reintroduction in the same Congress on July
11, 1977 as H.R. 8200.170 In the Senate, hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Improvements in the Judicial Machinery led to the introduc-
tion on November 1, 1977 of S. 2266171 and its reintroduction, with
substantial amendments, on July 17, 1978.172 On many issues, the
House and the Senate tended to take polar positions.
With respect to ICC involvement in the reorganization process, the
House bill contemplated even less participation by the ICC than was
incorporated in the original revision proposals. Under H.R. 8200, the
Commission's involvement was limited to its normal regulatory func-
tions,173except that any regulations which required the expenditure of
money would have been ineffective absent court approval 74 and aban-
donment of a line would have been possible over the objections of the
Commission. 175 At no time would it have been necessary to submit the
reorganization plan to the Commission, even for advisory report.
However, the ICC would have been granted standing to appear.176 In
167. See id. § 205(e).
168. H.R. 31, supra note 156, §§ 7-303(7)-(8), 9-503(d)(2); H.R. 32, supra note 156, §§ 7-
301(7)-(8), 10-503(d)(2); 1975-1976 Hearings, supra note 150, at 249, 320.
169. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
170. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 8200]; Hearings on
S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-366 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hear-
ings].
171. S. 2266, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 226b-1]; 1977Hearings,
supra note 170, at 3-366.
172. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. 22t6-2].
173. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1164; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 248-49.
174. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1164(1); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 248.
175. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1169; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 260-61. Given
the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC over abandonment petitions, it is unlikely
that a court would lightly ignore Commission opposition to any line abandonment or service
termination.
176. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1163; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 248.
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contrast, S. 2266, as introduced on November 1, 1977, required the ini-
tial petition for reorganization relief to be filed with both the court and
the Commission 17 7 and authorized the latter to hold its own hear-
ings. 171 It also required the filing of the reorganization plan with the
Commission for review, revision and approval 179 and authorized the
Commission to grant such approval over the objections of materially
and adversely affected creditors upon a finding "that the plan is fair
and equitable" and that "the public interest in continued rail service
...outweighs any adverse affect."' 80 Under this version of the Senate
bill, the ICC functioned not only as the advocate of the public interest,
but also as the arbitrator of any conflict between the public interest and
private rights. The second version of S. 2266, reported on July 17,
1978, reversed this approach and was more in line with the provisions
of H.R. 8200. The Commission would approve only those elements of
a plan that effect the transfer of any lines or operation of the debtor to
another railroad.'8 ' The overall approval and confirmation of the plan
and any balancing of public and private interests was returned to the
court. 1
82
With respect to time limits within which the reorganization process
must be complete, the House and the Senate again took different ap-
proaches. In H.R. 8200, the debtor was required to file a reorganiza-
tion plan within 120 days after the date on which the petition for
reorganization relief is granted; 83 however the court was authorized to
increase this period on request of any party in interest.' 84 No limit was
placed on the number or length of extensions of time in which to file a
plan that may be granted to the debtor, nor did H.R. 8200 contemplate
any time limit within which the court would confirm the reorganization
plan. Aside from the decreased involvement by the ICC in the reor-
ganization, there was nothing to prevent the process from being ex-
tremely lengthy, with concomitant erosion of the estate of the debtor
and the security of the creditor. In contrast, S. 2266, in its first version,
included time limits within which every major step in the reorganiza-
tion must be completed. Within 240 days after the filing of the petition
for relief, the trustee of the railroad would file a proposed reorganiza-
tion plan with the Commission.8 5 This filing date could be extended,
177. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1164; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 247-48.
178. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1168; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 246-48.
179. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1172; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 252-56.
180. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, §§ 1173(b)(1)-(2); 1977Hearings, supra note 170, at 255-
56.
181. S. 2266-2, supra note 172, at § 1171(c).
182. Id. §§ 1172-73.
183. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1121(b); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 216.
184. H.R. 8200, supra note 170, § 1121(d); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 217.
185. S. 2266-1, supra note 170, § 1172(a); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 252.
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but not by more than 120 days. m" 6 Within 90 days of filing, the Com-
mission would be required to publish a plan;'87 within another 90 days,
it would have to hold and complete hearings,18 8 and within a third 90
days, the plan as revised would have to be submitted to the court.
1 9
These time limits could be extended by the court upon the request of
the Commission;190 however, the first version of S. 2266 required the
Commission to submit a reorganization plan to the court within a pe-
riod ending 630 days after the date of the petition for reorganization
relief.'9 ' Upon a finding by the court that the Commission or the
trustee failed to submit plans within the statutory time period, "[the
court] shall order the proceeding converted to a case under chapter 7
[liquidation] of this title." 1
92
A two year time limit on railroad reorganization would have been
a great boon to the industry's creditors. The New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railway was in reorganization seven years before inclu-
sion into the Penn Central Transportation Company. 193 The Penn
Central, as well as the other five conveying railroads, were in reorgani-
zation more than two years before operation was assumed by Con-
rail. 194 The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad has now been
in reorganization for almost six years.' 95 It is understandable that the
time limits imposed by the first version of S. 2266 were highly criticized
by judges and trustees whose task is to transform a slow and unprofita-
ble railroad into an efficient and profitable carrier. 196 Nor is it surpris-
ing that the second version of S. 2266 eliminated these time
requirements; a reorganization plan had only to be filed with the court
within 18 months after the date of the petition for relief, and the court




187. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1172(d); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 253.
188. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1172(e); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 253.
189. Id.
190. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1172(f); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 253.
191. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1175; 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 257.
192. Id.
193. The New Haven petitioned for reorganization relief in July, 1961. The Penn Cen-
tral merger was not consumated until 1968. MOODY'S, supra note 74, at 710.
194. Conrail did not begin operations until April 1, 1976. MooDY'S, supra note 74, at
686. See notes 95-103 supra.
195. See note 124 supra.
196. See, e.g., statements of Judge McGarr, presently presiding over the reorganization
of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, and Mr. Manos, attorney for the carrier's
trustee. 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 773-802. Mr. Manos stated: "I find it totally
unrealistic to impose no time constraints on a widget manufacturer undergoing reorganiza-
tion while simultaneously ordering railroads operating in the public interest to file accepta-
ble plans within 28 months or be summarily liquidated." Id. at 788. See note 217 infra.
197. S. 2266-2, supra note 172, § 1171(a).
Neither H.R. 8200 nor the most recent version of the Senate bill
included time limits within which the reorganization must be com-
pleted. The Reform Act, however, follows the lead of the first version
of S. 2266 and imposes such a limit. "[1]f a plan has not been con-
firmed. . . before five years after the date of the order for relief, the
court shall, order the trustee to cease the debtor's operation and to col-
lect and reduce to money all of the property of the estate .... " 98
This is a mandatory section, stating the time period beyond which sus-
pension of creditor rights will not be permitted. It represents a compro-
mise between the suspension of creditor rights, permitted for a
reasonable period of time and required to effect a reorganization of the
railroad, and the creditor's need for a clear statement of when he can
foreclose on the security of the indebtedness. Whether the statutory
five-year period satisfies the constitutional test of reasonableness 99 is,
of course, a separate question, but one which, given past decisions,2"°
will almost assuredly be answered in the affirmative.
With respect to creditors whose claims were impaired by the reor-
ganization plan, the versions proposed by both the Judge's Conference
and the Bankruptcy Commission required that the claim of any credi-
tor whose class did not accept the reorganization must be satisfied to
the extent that it was allowed.20' This approach was in sharp contrast
to that of the existing Bankruptcy Act, which permitted the court to
approve a reorganization over the objections of a class of materially
and detrimentally affected creditors provided that its objections were
unreasonable under all the circumstances. 2  As noted in Section I of
this note, the circumstances considered by the court include the public's
interest in continued rail service. Both versions of S. 2266 rejected the
approach of the initial reform drafts and retained that of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, while being explicit as to the weight which should be af-
forded the public interest. The confirmation of a reorganization plan
over the objections of materially and adversely affected creditors would
require that "the public interest in continued rail service by the reorga-
nized debtor. . . [outweigh] any adverse effect on the creditors and
equity security holders," that the plan be "fair and equitable .. and
198. Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1174.
199. See text accompanying notes 25-36 supra.
200. The facts of the New Haven Inclusion Cases reveal a reorganization in progress for
more than five years and with no hope of future profitability for the carrier. The assets of
the railroad had eroded to a value below the debt owed to the mortgage bondholders. Still,
the Supreme Court affirmed a valuation of the carrier over the objection of the secured
creditors and held that their dedication of security to the public in the form of continued
deficit operation was reasonable and properly compelled. See text accompanying notes 25-
36 supra. The Reform Act, by comparison, would have been much less detrimental to the
New Haven's creditors.
201. See note 168 supra.
202. See 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (amended 1978).
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that it not discriminate unfairly against any class of creditors or equity
security holders."2 °3 The effect of this provision would be to treat the
public as a creditor with a claim for continued rail service that had
priority overall actual creditors.
The Reform Act, like the House draft of the bill, adopts the con-
trary approach. Confirmation of the plan of reorganization requires
that each class of creditors or equity security holders accept the plan or
suffer no impairment.2'
A claim is unimpaired if the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equi-
table, and contractual rights" to which the holder of the claim is enti-
tled, cures any default and compensates for damages, or provides for
cash payment on the effective date of the plan for the allowed amount
of any claim." Additionally, no plan may be confirmed unless each
creditor or equity security holder receives under the plan property of a
value greater than or equal to the liquidation value of the bankrupt as
of the effective date of the plan.20 6
This provision encourages acceptance of any plan submitted by
the impaired creditors. Since, absent confirmation, the most that any
creditor or equity security holder will receive is his liquidation share at
the end of the five-year reorganization period, any plan submitted for
confirmation will almost certainly improve on that amount. There is
no incentive to resist reorganization, and the court is never required to
balance creditor rights with the public's interest in being served.
The Reform Act also follows the trend to restrict ICC involvment
in the reorganization process. Under this scheme the debtor/railroad
remains within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission, with the
exception that orders requiring the expenditure of funds are not effec-
tive without the approval of the court.20 7 Abandonment of a line re-
quires the usual application to the Commission, but the court is
authorized to ignore the Commission's report.208 Any proposal to
transfer to or permit the operation of the debtor's lines by another rail-
road also requires the normal application to the ICC, but in these cases
the Commission's decision is deemed conclusive, subject only to appel-
late review.20 9 The Commission never need see the reorganization
plan; it is neither authorized to hold hearings, nor is it required to ex-
press its opinion on the plan. The Commission is granted the right to
203. S. 2266-1, supra note 171, § 1173(b); 1977 Hearings, supra note 170, at 255-56; S.
2266-2, supra note 172, § 1173(b).
204. Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 1129(a)(8), I173(a)(1); H.R. 8200, supra note 170,
§§ 1129(a)(8); 1173(a)(1); 1977Hearings, supra note 170, at 231.
205. Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1124.
206. Id. § 1173(a)(2).
207. Reform Act, supra note 3, § 1166.
208. Id. § 1170.
209. Id. § 1172(b).
"appear and be heard on any issue," but is denied standing to appeal
any order or judgement entered in the case.210 The protection of the
public's interest, along with the interests of the debtor, creditors and
equity security holders, is specifically charged to the court.2"
V. Conclusion
In summary, the Reform Act resolves many of the uncertainties
involved in bankruptcy reorganization of a railroad. The dual jurisdic-
tion by the bankruptcy court and the Interstate Commerce Commission
and concomitant time-consuming shuttle of plans between the two is
eliminated. The creation and confirmation of reorganization plans are
the sole responsibility of the court, except in circumstances of merger
and consolidation. An express time limit of five years is imposed on
the reorganization process and creditors and equity security holders are
guaranteed at least the liquidation value of their claims as of the effec-
tive date of the plan. No balancing of creditor interests and the public
interest in continued rail service is required; no class of creditors re-
jecting a proposed plan need ever be found unreasonable. 1 2
The judicial discretion, which via decisions like the New Haven
Inclusion Cases and Reconstruction Finance Corporation vitiated the
protection afforded the rail creditor by the Fifth Amendment, have
been eliminated in favor of a more mechanical statutory scheme. If
within five years after the initial petition for relief a reorganization plan
is proposed, the creditors and equity security holders may accept or
reject the plan.21 3 If the plan is accepted, all allowed claims are guar-
anteed satisfaction to at least their liquidation value as of the effective
date of the plan.21 4 If the plan is rejected, then the creditors are guar-
anteed the liquidation value of their claims through the actual liquida-
tion of the railroad at the end of the five-year period.2"5 In effect, the
legislature has adopted the conclusion of prior case law that the Consti-
tution does not prohibit the suspension of creditor's rights for a reason-
able period of time in order to effect a railroad reorganization plan.
Although Congress cannot alter the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment, Congress can enact, and has enacted, a reorgan-
ization statute that, without reliance on the Constitution, goes far in
safeguarding the rights of the railroad creditor.
The provision for a time limit on the reorganization process is re-
210. Id. § 1164.
211. d. § 1165.
212. Contrast this with the fate of the creditors in Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
213. Reform Act, supra note 3, §§ 1129, 1173(a)(1).
214. Id. § 1173(a)(2).
215. Id. § 1174.
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ally quite remarkable. Theoretically, reorganization relief is most ap-
propriate for the essentially profitable railroad, suffering only
imbalance in its equity and debt structure. If the revenue from tariffs is
sufficient to meet current operating expenses and only the fixed charges
of debt caused insolvency, then reorganization of the financial structure
is a reasonable form of relief. But if the carrier is suffering operating
deficits, has a deteriorating physical plant and cannot compete with
other carriers, reorganization becomes much more difficult. A funda-
mental restructuring of the railroad's competitive position in the mar-
ketplace of transportation is required, not a mere restructuring of
liabilities. The Reform Act's five-year time limit on reorganization
serves to separate the competitive railroad from the carrier that is ter-
minally ill and protects the creditor from involuntary funding of a
hopelessly inefficient operation.
The Reform Act provisions governing railroad reorganization do
perpetuate the practice of past case law in their treatment of the rail-
road's creditors,2 6 but with much greater protection of their interests.
The value of the creditor's claims may erode during the reorganization
process and his right to his security may be suspended for a reasonable
period of time, but the creditor is obligated to dedicate his property to
the public only to the extent that the railroad has a continuing obliga-
tion to render service; and, for the railroad in reorganization, that obli-
gation lasts only five years.
It is 1985 and the Northern and Southern Railway is again
burdened by d§6cit operations and a deteriorating physical plant.
The carrier seeks reorganization under the Bankruptcyr Reform Act
of 1978. Numerous plans of reorganization are proposed, but for-
seeing nofutureprofitabilityfor the carrier, each plan is rejected by
vote of the creditors. After five years the Northern and Southern
Railway is subjected to mandatory liquidation. Certain main lines
are purchased intact by otherprofitable carriers; many branch lines
are acquired by the communities which they service. The remainder
is auctionedfor scrap. The creditors receive the liquidation value of
their security without further deterioration due to compelled dficit
operation. The Northern and Southern will be reorganized no
more.
2 17
216. See text accompanying notes 25-36 supra.
217. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, which entered bankruptcy reorgani-
zation in 1975 for the third time this century, was recently the subject of an order of liquida-
tion by the bankruptcy court following the court's rejection of the trustee's reorganization
plan. Wall. St. J., Jan. 28, 1980, at 8, col. 1. The Rock has never enjoyed true prosperity and
it is burdened with one of the least profitable of routes: a north-south line in mid-America.
Its liquidation and parceling among the healthy carriers was inevitable, an example of which
is the Southern Pacific's recent effort to purchase the Tucamari, New Mexico to Kansas City
branch. See Letting the Rock Go Under, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1979, at 20, col. 4.
